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Liberalization is the unifying theme for policy in the developing world, but there is a growing
recognition that greater reliance on market forces to coordinate economic decision making has contradictory
implications for policy makers.  Liberalization reduces the direct role of the government in the economy.  We
should remember that it is the complexity of the resource allocation problem that gives market mechanisms the
decisive edge over planning.  But there is no avoiding the fact that the same sharp pencils we rely on to seek
out profitable opportunities will also respond to intended and unintended incentives generated by governments.
Markets make the effects of policies difficult to predict.  It is a universal observation that government
"intentions" are often frustrated by market reactions.  
In financial markets this is a particularly familiar refrain.  A state owned or directed financial system
did a poor job of allocating resources, and this blueprint for economic development has been decisively, and
in my view rightly, rejected.  But we have ample evidence that badly structured and regulated private financial
markets can also misallocate resources.  The message I want to emphasize in this paper is that the lasting
solution to this problem will be to severely limit the government's direct participation in financial markets and
at the same time to expand the government's role in supervision and prudential regulation.  In the transition to
a fully liberalized domestic financial system, partial controls on international capital movements may be a
useful component of the government's prudential regulation.    
Failure to adapt the government's policies to a liberalized financial system can be very costly in terms
of economic performance.  The overriding challenge facing policy makers in emerging markets is to establish
policy regimes that are immune from  financial crises.  Crises have recently damaged the economic health of
countries that have been considered models for economic development and stability.  As a result we are much
less confident in our understanding of the economic logic behind such events.  We are also unsure why some
crises are followed by long periods of economic recession while others are not.  
We are confident that there is growing discontent with the conventional wisdom concerning economic
policy.  The unhappy fact seems to be that a stable macroeconomic environment may be necessary but not
sufficient to coax the desired outcomes from liberalized financial systems.  In this paper we review several
promising extensions of the conventional model and discuss their policy implications.  
There are at least three analytic frameworks that might help us understand why crises occur and why
they are so costly.  The first, what I will call the macro-fundamental model, was developed by Paul Krugman
in 1979.  The important message from this framework and its many descendants is that inconsistent macro
policy regimes will end in predictable and anticipated crashes.  The crashes do not appear to be related to
fundamental macroeconomic policies but they are.  The policy advice that flows from this framework is2
straightforward.  Get the fundamentals right and there is nothing to fear.  In practice this is the model that
motivates conventional policy prescriptions as embodied, for example, in IMF rescue packages.  This
framework emphasizes flows of incomes and expenditures and the role of relative prices in getting the flows
right.  While this framework is a bit battered it has persuasive proponents.  Moreover, it takes a theory to beat
a theory and there is no coherent alternative at the moment.
   The second framework is a radical departure from this comforting and familiar advice.  The unifying
theoretical result on which this framework is based is that the equilibrium regime might depend on private
expectations about the regime.  This is a radical departure in that it implies that a consistent macro regime is
vulnerable to speculative attacks and the associated welfare costs.  
It should be noted, however, that this multiple equilibria framework does not suggest that the traditional
approach is wrong—inconsistent macro regimes will collapse.  But even consistent regimes might require
additional measures to ensure stability.  The policy implications are that in addition to getting the fundamentals
right, the government must undertake measures to protect the regime from speculative attacks.  The additional
measures suggested by the multiple equilibria models include careful control of the size, maturity and currency
denomination of the government's on and off balance sheet assets and liabilities. 
The third framework also focuses on the government's balance sheets but for different reasons.  The
basic idea of the insurance model is that the microeconomics of financial intermediation and the government's
role in financial intermediation are the primary sources of crises.  Crises in this framework are not related to
changes in private expectations or to inconsistencies in macro regimes.  Instead the policy inconsistency arises
from the desire of governments to accumulate financial assets in order to smooth national consumption and the
desire to insure the domestic financial system. 
The policy advice drawn from this framework is once again "additional."  Thus, if the analyses
discussed above are useful the requirements for stability derived from the insurance model must be added to
those derived from conventional macro and multiple equilibria models.
The objective for the following pages is to explore the issues raised by these alternative ways of
understanding crises.  Although we will not settle these issues, important policy implications nevertheless
emerge.  One conclusion is that we have probably focused too much on countries' or governments' income
statements and not enough on their balance sheets.  Sustainable flows of government expenditures and receipts
and  sustainable flows of international trade in goods and services do not insure financial stability.
Governments can and do take large leveraged financial positions--that is, they sell assets to buy liabilities.
Equally important, governments intentionally and unintentionally create incentives for private investors to take3
positions that can lead to capital losses that the government has to cover.  Financial liberalization frees market
participants to exploit such incentives and thereby magnify government losses.  Such losses can bankrupt a
regime quickly and without warning.  It follows that debt management policy broadly defined might hold the
key for managing a market-oriented domestic and international financial system.
II. Macro Fundamentals
       The apparent randomness of speculative attacks has long been cited as evidence that attacks were caused
by random and therefore irrational changes in private expectations.  A disdain for the herd mentality of
financial markets is particularly common in those who write books about the subject.  This view was challenged
by formal models of speculative attacks that seemed to explain attacks in terms of fundamentals (Krugman
(1979), Flood and Garber (1984)).  The important contribution of what have since become known as first
generation models is that they provide a simple explanation for the fact that nothing special happens to the
fundamentals on the day of an attack and yet the attack involves a discrete reduction in the central bank's
foreign exchange reserves.  
In Krugman's model the driving force is a conflict between the government's exchange rate commitment
and its fiscal policy.  As long as the fixed exchange rate regime survives, a fiscal deficit is financed by gradual
reductions in the central bank's reserves.  On the day the attack occurs the government's reserves fall discretely
to zero and the exchange rate is allowed to float.  There is nothing apparently special about that day in terms
of the fiscal deficit but there is something special about yields on assets, in this case on money balances. 
 Because the exchange rate regime ends when reserves go to zero, subsequent deficits are financed by
money creation.  The associated increase in expected inflation and nominal interest rates reduces the real return
on, and demand for, real money balances and this is accommodated by the discrete sale of international reserves
(the foreign part of the monetary base) to the private sector.  This model teaches the important lesson that
rational economic behavior driven by fundamentals that evolve smoothly over time can involve dramatic attacks
(asset exchanges between the government and the private sector) and changes in regimes that seem to be
unrelated to contemporaneous changes in the fundamentals.   
In searching for empirical verification of traditional balance of payments attack models, a recurrent
theme is that regularities are difficult to find.  Frankel and Rose (1996) review the evidence for developing
countries.  They find that crises, defined by dramatic increases in the rate of change in nominal exchange rates,
are associated with the composition of capital flows, reserve levels, domestic credit growth, international4
interest rates, and real exchange rates.  They also find that the fundamentals emphasized in Krugman's model,
current account deficits and fiscal deficits, seem not to be associated with crises.  
This evidence is widely interpreted as favoring multiple equilibria models of speculative attacks.  Sachs
et al. (1996), for example, argue that the attack against the Mexican Peso could not have been anticipated
because interest differentials in favor of the peso were much too small to compensate investors that expected
peso depreciation.  
Krugman (1996) addresses this literature and argues that first generation models remain useful in
understanding recent crises.  He emphasizes the fact that a range of fundamental policy conflicts can trigger
an attack.  For example, an extended period of high unemployment can conflict with the government's
commitment to a fixed exchange rate and the associated constraint on monetary policy.  The fundamentals
behind the attack may be difficult to identify but this does not mean that arbitrary shifts in expectations are a
preferred alternative.       
Dornbusch (1997), in evaluating the outlook for Brazil, also remains within the traditional framework.
He emphasizes the real exchange rate as the fundamental determinant of stability for the regime, a view
consistent with first generation models.  Dornbusch warns, moreover, that events that might trigger an attack
should not be confused with the determinants of the attack: "a political reversal could break a pattern of
continuity and credibility and lead to a sell off; a bout of easy money would hasten a crisis, a fragile banking
system with currency exposure would magnify the collapse, and a liquid debt structure would accelerate and
magnify the collapse.  Financial considerations are all important in interpreting specific events, but must not
be misconstrued as the primary or sole source of a collapse (pp. 383-84)."
For policy makers these are important reminders.  Even if one or a few speculative attacks are difficult
to relate to macro fundamentals, there is no reason to believe that inconsistent policies will not generate crises
in the future.
III. Multiple Equilibria
The apparent lack of correspondence between the fundamentals and attacks has inspired a second
generation of models that rely on shifts in private speculative expectations to trigger an attack.  It has long been
recognized that changes in the policy regime that are expected to prevail following a successful attack can
generate a successful speculative attack even if the government follows fully consistent policies preceding the
attack (Krugman (1996), Garber (1996)).  But this is not the story behind this new literature.5
      A much more stringent condition for a self-fulfilling attack is that a shift in private expectations about
government behavior generates a change in the optimal policy regime.  Calvo (1988) summarizes the
implications of the argument as follows: "The implications for policy could be staggering: for our results
suggest that postponing taxes (i.e., falling into debt) may generate the seeds of indeterminacy; it may, in other
words, generate a situation in which the effects of policy are at the mercy of people's expectations--gone would
be the hopes of leading the economy along an optimal path."  Flood and Garber (1984) and Obstfeld (1986)
show that if governments are expected to follow more expansionary monetary policies following a successful
speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate regime, policy regimes that are otherwise viable can be forced
to collapse by self-fulfilling private expectations. 
Obstfeld (1994) refines the argument by specifying the political economy that might account for the
government's behavior before and after an attack. The analysis sets out a rational government that seeks to
maximize a plausible objective function. Since the government's objectives are the same in any exchange rate
regime it follows that policy setting under different regimes must reflect changes in the economic environment
rather than arbitrary assumptions concerning the government's behavior.
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) argue that self-fulfilling models offer a better interpretation of the
ERM crises in 1992 as compared to first generation models.  Their general point is that the ERM members that
were forced to abandon their exchange rate commitments played by the rules of the game for a viable system
as long as entry into the European Monetary Union was a feasible objective. 
      To buttress this interpretation, Eichengreen et al. (1996b) offer empirical evidence that the fundamentals
behaved differently in the months leading up to the ERM crisis as compared to a sample of crises in other fixed
exchange rate regimes.  In particular, they argue that the ERM crisis was not preceded by excessive money
growth, growth in domestic assets, fiscal deficits, or a number of other variables usually associated with
inconsistent policies.
More recently several papers have examined crises in emerging markets and concluded that shifts in
private expectations are important elements in an attack sequence.   Calvo and Mendoza (1995) argue that the
crisis in Mexico in 1994 is consistent with the idea that the government's short-term debt and the anticipation
of a bailout for a weak banking system made it vulnerable to a shift in private expectations.  Cole and Kehoe
(1996) also argue that events in Mexico are consistent with a self fulfilling crisis.  Sachs et al. (1996) examine
characteristics of 20 countries that seem to contribute to their vulnerability to speculative attacks following the
Mexican crisis in 1994.  They find that prior lending booms, overvalued exchange rates and low levels of
reserves relative to M2 explain a large part of this experience. They also find that fiscal and current account6
deficits seem to be unrelated to a country’s vulnerability to attack. 
IV. Insurance Attacks
An important objection to first generation models is that attacks on Mexico and more recently on
Thailand and other Asian countries were preceded by very large private capital inflows.  Moreover, yields on
domestic currency assets in the weeks leading up to devaluations do not carry large yield premia that would
be consistent with an expected devaluation.  This seems to suggest that investors are at first too bullish and
then, in herd-like behavior, change their minds and rush out of a country.  This is an appealing story to officials
that want to blame speculators for their trouble.  But before we embrace this argument it is important to recall
that the failure of a specific first generation model does not imply in any way that multiple equilibria are at
work.  
Dooley (1997) develops an alternative first generation model that seems to be consistent both with
private capital inflows preceding a crisis and the absence of devaluation expectations.  The policy conflict in
the background in the model is between the desire of a credit-constrained government to hold reserve assets as
a form of self-insurance and the government's desire to insure financial liabilities of residents. The first
objective is met by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. The second objective generates incentives
for investors to acquire the government's reserves when yield differentials make this optimal.
The insurance model predicts that three fundamentals must be present in order to generate a private
capital inflow followed by a speculative attack.  The first is that the government must have positive-net
international reserves.  Net reserves in this model are defined to include contingent assets and liabilities.
Second, the government's commitment to exhaust these net reserves to pay off an implicit or explicit insurance
contract must be credible  That is, it must be consistent with the government's incentives and ability to mobilize
and exhaust its net worth after the attack begins.  Third, private investors must have access to transactions that
produce insured losses.  As long as one ingredient is missing there will be no capital inflow and no crisis. Crisis
episodes are associated with the relaxation of a binding constraint.
  These ingredients provide a plausible capital inflow/crisis sequence. The availability of free insurance
raises the market yield on a set of liabilities issued by residents for a predictable time period.  This yield
differential generates a private gross capital inflow (a sale of domestic liabilities to nonresidents) that continues
until the day of attack. The private inflow is necessarily associated with some combination of an increase in
the government's international reserve assets, a current account deficit and a gross private capital outflow. But7
the distribution among these offsetting transactions is unimportant. 
As long as the "foreign" investors earn above market yields there is a disincentive for an attack on the
government’s assets. Investors will prefer to hold the growing stock of high yield insured liabilities of residents
and allow the government to hold reserves that earn the risk free-rate. Private profits are realized before the
attack. 
The attack itself is generated by competition to avoid losses.  When the contingent liabilities of the
government are just equal to the government's assets, competition among investors will insure that all will call
the insurance option. The incentive to do so is that from that date forward their share of the insurance pool will
begin to shrink and expected yields will fall below market rates. Recall that resident borrowers will continue
to appropriate a part of the loans and this will force expected yields below alternatives.
Following an attack the regime returns to its initial equilibrium in which the government's net
international reserves have returned to zero. The loss of reserves might force the government to abandon its
commitment to manage the exchange rate.  An observer determined to apply a currency attack model will have
to appeal to multiple equilibria.  In fact, there is no shift in expectations.
The empirical association between banking and currency crises is well established.  Gavin and
Hausmann (1995) document the relationship between lending booms and financial crises in Latin America.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) show, in a sample of 76 balance of payments crises and 26 banking crises in
20 developing countries from 1970 to 1995, that about one-quarter of the banking crises occur within one year
of a balance of payments crisis. Their interpretation of the evidence is that balance of payments crises were
unrelated to banking crises during the 1970s when financial markets within these countries were highly
regulated. Following liberalization of domestic financial markets in the 1980s, banking and balance of
payments crises were closely linked and banking crises preceded balance of payments crises. 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) examine four recent examples of banking/balance of payments crises in
Finland, Mexico, Sweden and Chile. In each case capital inflows preceded the crises by three to six years and
lending booms occurred in domestic banking markets over the same intervals. The crises were followed, except
in the case of Sweden, by substantial capital outflows and in all cases by a sharp reduction in bank credit. Their
model suggests that intermediation involving maturity transformation is likely to increase capital inflows
relative to equilibria in which there is no intermediation but at the cost of increasing the probability of a run
on the banking system. Since the run on the banking system depletes reserves it also increases the chances that
a fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned.  
This literature has clarified two important points. First, the government’s net reserves support twoThe two objective/one policy tool problem is well known. Wigmore (1987), for example, argues that the choice of the new Federal Reserve system to
1
protect its gold reserves in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate forced them to accept the bank failures that may have triggered the 1930s'
depression.  For a discussion of the conflict in the context of currency boards see Caprio et al. (1996). 
8
policy regimes:  the banking/financial system and the exchange rate regime. An attack on either regime that
exhausts reserves will necessarily have important implications for the other regime. This will make
identification of the causes of a crisis difficult.   Second, rapid growth in the stock of bank credit may be an
1
early warning that potential losses in the financial system and the associated contingent government insurance
liability are approaching a crisis level.
V. Solutions: Debt Management Policy
Simple accounting and common sense suggest that even the most conservative fiscal and monetary
policy regime places no restrictions on the financial risks a government might choose to undertake or undertake
inadvertently.  Governments can and do issue liabilities in order to acquire assets.  That is they engage in
financial intermediation.  Moreover, governments' activities in financial markets are related to a wide range of
policy objectives.  
The most carefully monitored debt management policy is the decision to defer taxation, or what is the
same thing, the decision to increase net debt (sell liabilities or assets).  But financing fiscal imbalances is only
a part of debt management policy.  Governments of developing countries have also been very active financial
intermediaries.  Like private intermediaries they have levered their net debt (asset) position by issuing financial
assets in order to acquire liabilities.  Like private intermediaries they have also assumed very large "off balance
sheet" contingent liabilities.  Finally, they have recently been active participants in derivative markets.
These activities are related to a number of policy objectives and economic shocks.  Banking crises have
forced the government to purchase their banks' nonperforming loans and sometimes the banks themselves.
Governments have issued debt to finance these purchases.  Sterilized exchange market intervention has
generated very large changes in governments' assets and liabilities.  For example, in the face of private capital
inflows governments have chosen to acquire foreign exchange reserves in order to resist the appreciation of
their currencies and declines in domestic interest rates.  These purchases are typically financed by the issue of
domestic currency debt.  Private capital outflows reverse these transactions.  Devaluation has forced
governments to assume guaranteed private external debt.  Buy-backs of sovereign debt have reduced the market
value of private external debt and increased debt to official lenders.  Privatization has reduced domestic and
foreign debt at the cost of reducing the government's nonfinancial assets.  Finally, social safety nets have been9
expanded in some cases and in others reduced through privatization.    
Each of these policy decisions alters the government's balance sheet and, in turn, alters the exposure
of the government to changes in the relative values of assets and liabilities.  As domestic capital markets have
become more integrated with international markets the distinction between the governments' domestic and
international balance sheets has become less obvious.  The key issue for debt and asset management policy is
whether or not the uncoordinated sum of these policies is likely to be nearly optimal.  Is there a good reason
to impose some overall discipline on the governments participation in financial markets?  
If so it will be necessary to add a careful analysis of the government's balance sheet to the traditional
income expenditure framework.  This is no small step.  Most governments do not compile a useful balance
sheet and, in almost all cases, no one decision maker has the responsibility for protecting the value of that
balance sheet.  The result is a balkanization of financial management that generates unintended and costly
errors.  In my view the international organizations have a heavy responsibility to guide the statistical and
analytical efforts necessary to compile and interpret national balance sheets. 
One place to start such an analysis is to review how governments of industrial countries have dealt with
these issues.  The perhaps surprising answer is that orthodox debt and asset management policy consists largely
of limiting the government's participation in financial intermediation.  Industrial country governments have
learned the hard way that capital gains and losses inevitably follow from leveraged financial positions.
Governments are given little political credit for gains but swift electoral retribution for losses.  
Since governments cannot avoid some net asset or liability position unless they always match
expenditure with taxation there is always some financial position to be managed.  In general, this debt or asset
management follows a simple and predictable rule.  Debt is comprised of a single class of domestic currency
denominated nonindexed bonds with a "long" maturity.
Debt management policy in developing countries must also be concerned with financial crises.  Recent
papers by Calvo and Mendoza (1995), for example, emphasize debt management in the context of multiple
equilibria models.  The important insight is that if private expectations are volatile and, if that volatility can
generate self-fulfilling crises, it is important that the government insulate its financial position from changes
in expectations.  An obvious implication of these models is that the stock of government liabilities that matures
on a given day is a useful measure of the vulnerability of that government to a shift in private expectations.
For example, the shortening of the maturity of government debt leading up to the Mexican crisis is cited as an
unwise contribution to the governments' vulnerability.
   The interesting policy issue here is that, even if it appears to be expensive in terms of debt service costs
to borrow long, it is important to do so to avoid crises.  Another important insight is that governments'
liabilities include insured deposits in the domestic banking system.  Since these are typically short-term assets10
the governments' contingent liabilities can be the source of vulnerability.  
Another important theme in this literature is that rapid growth of domestic credit is a good indicator
that a reversal of expectations could be imminent.   Sachs et al. (1996) provide a clear analysis of how domestic
financial liberalization and weak regulatory systems have generated lending booms in emerging markets.
"Financial liberalization typically is accompanied by aggressive behavior on the part of banks.  In order to raise
deposits, banks increase interest rates and fund more risky projects.  Given the existence of deposit insurance
(implicit or explicit) depositors find it profitable to move to these banks.  Although the purpose of prudential
regulation is to impede this tendency, during the early years of liberalization the capacity for oversight is
usually poor.  Consequently when significant capital inflows take place in early stages of financial
liberalization, the lending boom that follows is likely to be associated with an increase in the riskiness and
vulnerability of bank portfolios...The weaknesses of the banking system do not surface until capital inflows
reverse (p. 191)."  Clearly prudential regulation of the domestic banking system and, more generally the
domestic financial system, is an integral and important part of the government's debt management policy.  
VI. Debt Management and the Cost of Crises
Even careful government will experience difficulties in the face of a very large shock to the world
economy.  Complete safety would require very little interaction with international capital markets.  Dooley
(1996) focuses on the idea that if trouble comes, debt structures might have an important bearing on the real
costs of the crisis.  A major failure of models of crises is their failure to explain the prolonged slump in
economic activity that follows some crises.  Compare, for example, the relative boom in the UK following the
1992 ERM crisis with the prolonged slump in Mexico and Argentina following the 1994 crises.  Which
experience will Thailand and other Asian countries share?  We don't know.  
One way to think about this issue is to assume that a country is unable to effectively utilize its capital
stock until the financial crisis is resolved.  Since different debt structures incorporate different participants in
a restructuring, it is important that the government look ahead to minimize the costs associated with alternative
debt structures.  
Why might the debtor care about the structure of debt following a default?  If there is a single debtor
and full information it is reasonable to guess that there will be an immediate agreement to restructure the debt
regardless of its characteristics.  In fact, there is no compelling need to renegotiate the formal debt contracts
since payments to a single class of creditors are probably unrelated to the existing contracts.
If there are many creditors, however, this simple equilibrium breaks down.  In particular, creditors now11
have the opportunity to bargain with other creditors in order to minimize their share of the loss.  This can be
modeled in a variety of ways but one appealing idea is that different creditors have different opportunity costs
but imperfect information about each other.  In some circumstances this will generate a war of attrition among
the creditors as each delays settlement even though the prize, in this case the country's ability to pay, melts
away.
While the negotiations are ongoing the debtor government cannot enter into credible contracts with
third parties.  We might think of this as the inability to obtain trade credit making it difficult to use the capital
stock that was acquire by issuing debt initially.  
Once this conflict begins the only rule is that there are no rules.  Where default is sometimes
unavoidable, the structure of the government’s financial debt determines the participants in the conflict over
rescheduling the debt and their relative bargaining strength.  This aspect of debt management policy becomes
more important as the probability of unavoidable default rises.  In some cases it will be optimal to limit self-
interested bargaining by issuing only one type of debt that by conventional measures appears to be very costly
to the government.   
Market yields before the crisis on alternative types if debt are not a useful measure of the cost of
alternative credits to debtors.  A creditor group that will impose significant costs on the debtor following a
default will offer credits on what seem to be relatively attractive terms. But that same group might impose
relatively large dead weight losses on all the participants in the rescheduling that follows an unavoidable
default.  Since there is no reason for the "tough" creditor to internalize the dead weight loss imposed on others
following a default, the terms offered the creditor are not a useful guide to debt management policy. This is a
particularly interesting result because results drawn from familiar models of debt management for industrial
countries imply that debt offerings that are welfare improving also minimize the government’s debt service cost.
The task for the debt manager is to identify a set of efficient debt structures and then choose the best structure
given the probability that an unavoidable recontracting will occur.
The basic argument can be reduced to a series of simple conjectures.  First, for emerging markets the
welfare costs of financial crises are far more important than the costs of other distortions usually cited as a
justification for an active debt management policy.  This conjecture is supported by the observation that
financial crises in developing countries are followed by depressed economic activity for extended time periods.
Second, the government can best reduce the exposure of the regime to crises by limiting its net debt position
and by avoiding variability to its net worth associated with financial intermediation.  The balance sheet relevant
for this calculation goes well beyond the set of assets and liabilities that are actively managed.  Finally, in cases
where crises are unavoidable in some states of the world the government should design its financial balance
sheet to minimize the welfare losses associated with crises.   12
The policy implications of this argument are striking and are quite similar to those that are suggested
by multiple equilibria models.  The most important is that the apparent cost of issuing a debt instrument is not
an appropriate guide for debt management in emerging markets.  To the contrary, minimizing debt service costs
in normal times becomes an increasingly misleading guide for policy as the probability of crisis rises. 
Moreover, since the probability that a crisis will occur depends on the variability of the government's
net worth, leverage should be avoided.  For example, sterilized exchange market intervention, lender of last
resort commitments, and government loan guarantees may be inconsistent with optimal debt management
policy.  
VII. Are Capital Controls the Answer?
     One important lesson that can be drawn from first generation models is that capital control programs are
very unlikely to prevent this type of attack.  The obvious problem here is that a current account deficit and
private capital outflows weaken the government's position over time.  When a discrete parity change is
expected, yield differentials generated by control programs are too small as compared to the capital gains
available to private investors that correctly anticipate a parity change. There is some chance that controls will
prolong the life of the regime and "buy time" while the government comes to grips with its policy conflicts but,
in the end, the regime will collapse.  
The role of capital controls in preventing self-fulfilling speculative attacks seems obvious. It is
plausible that effective controls would delay the end of a regime that suffered a spontaneous change in private
expectations.  Nevertheless, the contrary argument is equally plausible. If the private sector knows that the
system is protected by controls, they would be less impressed by observed stability.  Lane and Rojas-Suarez
(1992), for example, argue that the use of controls has ambiguous implications for credibility of a monetary
policy regime.
      The role of capital controls is also problematic because self-fulfilling attacks can go in the opposite
direction.  It is perhaps informative that there seem to be few examples of changes in private expectations
generating self-fulfilling virtuous responses by governments.  Countries that start from a bad equilibrium
should shun capital controls since they would delay adjustment to the new more optimistic private expectations.
In summary the first two analytical frameworks offer little hope for controls as a means for avoiding
crises.  The insurance model, however, is more friendly to the view that controls are a useful policy option.
The simple argument is that regulation of capital inflows might be an effective way to starve an insurance crisis
of the fuel that sustains it.  Dooley (1996) summarizes arguments that suggest that a Tobin, or transactions,
tax on capital flows is very unlikely to be welfare improving because holding periods have not been13
convincingly related to speculative behavior.  But the insurance model does provide a clear rationale for this
type of tax. The key is that the insurance model provides a good reason to believe that holding periods of
investors exploiting insurance are different, and probably shorter, as compared to normal (honest) investors.
The capital inflow-attack sequence has an expected duration.  If this is relatively short a transactions tax might
fall disproportionately on this type of capital flow. The right tax would eliminate the incentive to exploit the
insurance.  Moreover the usual finding that controls effect the structure of the capital account but not total
private flows is exactly the result that might reduce the probability of an insurance inflow/attack sequence. 
To summarize there is an interesting relationship between domestic liberalization and the liberalization
of international capital flows.  The first offers obvious advantages in terms of resource allocation.  But
domestic financial liberalization also means that "good policies" include a number of additional and stringent
constraints on governments' behavior.  In the short-run it may prove difficult to get all of these conditions right
particularly since they involve stocks of asset and liabilities.  In these circumstances international capital flows
might feed the growth of welfare reducing financial intermediation.  In fact, a good summary of the historical
record is that any very rapid growth in financial intermediation is likely to turn out badly.  In a fully liberalized
economy prudential controls will sort this out but in the early phase of domestic liberalization some residual
control on international capital mobility might be a useful component of the governments array of prudential
controls.       14
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